

# **The Strategy for CARE International in the West Bank & Gaza**

**April, 2005**


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## Strategy for CARE International in West Bank & Gaza

CARE International's vision is to seek a world of hope, tolerance and social justice where poverty has been overcome and people live in dignity and security. CARE International will be a global force and partner of choice within a world wide movement dedicated to ending poverty. We will be known everywhere for our unshakeable commitment to the dignity of people.

**CARE International's mission in the West Bank and Gaza is to engage with Palestinian communities in development processes that enable them to determine their future, realize their rights and live in peace and dignity.**



## Introduction

We describe here the context, approach and results of the process that has been taken by CARE West Bank & Gaza to develop our strategy.

The resulting vision, mission and strategic directions will guide our work in the coming years in the West Bank and Gaza to have a significant impact on development processes for Palestinian communities. Our new strategy was developed during 2004-5 for the period 2006-10.

## Context for developing the strategy

When we began the strategic planning process in May 2004 we struggled to visualize future scenarios other than one of increasing decline, including deepening poverty, decreasing access to basic rights, failing governance, increasing social and geographic fragmentation and shifting donor agendas. The Israeli/Palestinian peace process had foundered and the occupation of Iraq by the United States and its allies became the focus of international attention in the Middle East. The occupation continued to brutalize the Palestinian population, and Palestinians began taking the law into their own hands in the absence of the rule of law. Like many others, we were dispirited and exhausted by the conflict and humanitarian crisis of the last three years.

As we were developing our strategic directions, the political landscape began to change: a new Palestinian President; national elections scheduled; Israeli withdrawal from Gaza planned; and a renewed interest in reviving the peace process. It is still too soon to know how events will unfold, and mindful of the lessons learned of the past, we have sought to develop a strategy, which is sufficiently robust and flexible to guide us into the uncharted future.

Our last strategic plan was developed in the summer of 2000, in an atmosphere of optimism and hope. Yet by the spring of the following year all that changed. The second *intifada* precipitated four years of violent conflict. Like many organizations, our strategic plan lay on the shelf, its relevance forgotten in our scramble to address urgent humanitarian needs. CARE grew rapidly during this period, from sixteen staff and three projects in 2000 to over sixty staff and multiple projects and donors in 2004.

On reflection we saw that we had become overly reactive, unfocussed and unable to apply a more thoughtful, constructive and sustainable approach to our work. We have not been able to significantly develop our work with our local partners, many of whom began to see international agencies as competitors for donor funds. As the population became more impoverished our frontline staff became more eager to do everything, everywhere.

The lesson we learned from our experience is that to be useful, a strategy must be able to guide us through complex and unpredictable prevailing conditions. We could not risk limiting ourselves to a fixed plan which would constrain us if the external context changed significantly. Was the direction setting process going to be worth the effort? How could we be sure the strategic directions would not end up on the shelf again? In attempting to answer these questions we have clarified the challenges inherent in being strategic in a context of chronic conflict and uncertainty. We were acutely aware that we needed to focus our work, be strategic rather than reactive, and thoughtful rather than mechanistic. We wanted a strategy that would guide and inform the decisions we make, and that would guide and inform the way in which we worked.

## **Our understanding of strategy and its development**

In engaging in our strategy development process, we consciously set out to open and deepen our understanding of the positive potential of an appropriate strategy for our Country Office operation. We explored our understanding of strategy as a *process* rather than as a *plan*. We discussed the dangers inherent in a long-term plan that risks constraining and reducing an organization's effectiveness, rather than a process that supports and guides the appropriate balance between focus and flexibility. We opted to conceptualize our strategy development as an ongoing process of dialogue, in which we seek to continue understanding, anticipating and responding to external realities.

We aimed to build our understanding of ourselves as strategists – collectively engaged in crafting the way forward, based on our emerging shared understanding, our complementary experience and the developing shared sense of the fundamental difference we wish to make to the lives of Palestinian people.

We have deliberately sought to keep our strategy broad enough to allow us strategic 'space' to adjust the balance and emphasis of our work appropriately in a volatile and complex environment. At the same time, we have sought to build a much stronger and clearer shared sense of the boundaries to that 'strategic space', and to provide ourselves with a clear set of mutually complementary strategic directions that give coherent definition to our role and relevance. Throughout, we have sought to build our collective capacity as an organization to continue to engage in a strategic dialogue.

We think we have done that. Our next challenge is to understand that being strategic and effective is an ongoing process. It will involve change and commitment at all levels of our organization.

## **Process**

To support our conceptualization of strategy as a collective process of dialogue and reflection, we determined to take time over the development of our analysis and its

implications for our organizational future. Our process was carefully staged to allow time for information gathering, reflection, discussion and revisiting of assumptions. It was guided and supported throughout by an external consultant.

Initial work was undertaken by the Country Office Strategy Development Steering Group, gathering information and data on: socio-economic trends; political and funding trends; our own performance and capacities as an organization. This information, plus earlier evaluations and Country Office retreats, formed the backdrop to the first collective strategy workshop at which we sought to map out the external and internal strategic issues we were facing (Ramallah, September 2004).

In seeking to deepen our understanding of causality in our analysis of poverty and injustice, we asked ourselves:

- What is happening and changing in people's lives – both positive and negative?
- To whom is it happening, and where?
- What are the underlying drivers for these changes?
- How might these trends develop in the future?

We then reviewed the outputs of these discussions, and to strengthen our analysis and support our synthesis we examined them in relation to the conceptual model being explored by CARE USA, Moving CARE's Programming Forward: Unifying Framework for Poverty Eradication, Social Justice & Underlying Causes of Poverty (McCaston, October 2004). Our intention in doing this was to ensure increased depth of understanding about causality, and breadth of scope in our strategic thinking.

This 'interim analysis' resulted in agreement on five key strategic themes for us to pursue in our strategy. These were:

- Deepening poverty
- Declining basic rights and access to services
- Increasing social and geographic fragmentation
- Decreasing standards of governance
- Unclear donor trends

The five themes emerging from our contextual analysis (as set out pages 7 - 11) formed the cornerstones for our next event at which we took our conversation further (Jericho, December 2004). Using a broad 'strategic architecture' to help frame our discussion, and recognizing the vision of CARE International as the starting point for the definition of our mission and strategy, we examined each of the five themes and sought to agree on what we should be aiming to achieve at a strategic level. We asked how we should approach those aims, and how CARE should position itself as one of the major development actors in the Palestinian development process.

It became clear to us that our strategy was signaling some important strategic shifts and commitments for our organization. These were:

- A shift towards an increased focus on rights based approaches
- A shift towards targeting the most vulnerable social groups
- A shift towards working more explicitly with other development actors, including government, district authorities and other NGOs to strengthen governance
- A commitment to extend our range of connections as an organization and to increasing our indirect influence
- A preliminary signal to explore our relationships with like-minded Israeli organizations

The commitments to these new directions formed the basis for our final strategy workshop, (Jericho, February 2005), at which we pushed deeper in our discussions to define further our core intentions. We examined the implications not only for what themes or issues we should work on, but also began to discuss the ways in which we will need to strengthen and adjust our approaches, and the implications for the organizational capacities and relationships we need to develop.

What follows is the contextual analysis that underpins our understanding of the characteristics and underlying causes of poverty and injustice in the West Bank and Gaza.

## Contextual analysis of underlying causes of poverty & injustice in the West Bank and Gaza

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### 1. Deepening poverty.

In four years, the average per capita income in the West Bank and Gaza has declined by 40%. Before the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada in 2000, Palestinians had high levels of participation in basic and higher education, low rates of maternal and infant mortality, and a per capita income which left few people with incomes below the poverty line. The main sources of livelihood came from jobs generated by tourism, light industry, stone quarrying and horticulture in the West Bank and Gaza, from wage labour in Israel, and through donor assistance to the Palestinian Authority and to the longstanding Palestinian refugee population through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

The 40% decline in average per capita income has pushed more than half the population below the poverty line. The most vulnerable are the families whose male members formally worked locally or in Israel, who don't own land, and who are not eligible for services and material aid provided by UNRWA.

In terms of geography, the poorest people are more likely to live in the areas most affected by severe restrictions on movement imposed by Israel. The villages in the northern and southern West Bank, and the formally thriving commercial townships of Nablus, Bethlehem and Hebron are most severely affected as are those inhabitants of Gaza who do not qualify for assistance from UNRWA.

CARE field staff working on food security programs in the northern West Bank, an area deeply affected by the loss of livelihoods, report that in some communities almost all households now qualify for assistance. An assessment of household livelihoods CARE conducted in three villages in the northern West Bank showed an increasing trend to subsistence agriculture/horticulture in the absence of opportunities for wage labour and commercial enterprise<sup>1</sup>. The most vulnerable are those families who do not have access to land, and whose adult members are not able to work.

In the absence of an effective government funded social safety net, a wide range of local and international social agencies are providing material support to vulnerable families. Dependence upon food aid and material assistance and from cash remittances from family members overseas has increased over the last five years. The largest provider of food aid to the non-refugee population, the World Food Program, has increased its case load to 380,845.

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<sup>1</sup> Household Livelihood Assessment Report, CARE WBG, November 2004

## 2. Declining basic rights and access to services.

The decline in basic rights and reduced access to essential services in the West Bank and Gaza is a consequence of the military occupation of the Palestinian territories by Israel as well as the inability of the Palestinian Authority to ensure the delivery of services, enact the rule of law and provide social protection to the most vulnerable members of society.

The military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel since 1967 inhibits Palestinians in realizing their rights as defined by international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions. Lack of recourse and due process with the Israeli authorities is a major barrier to the capacity of Palestinians to claim their civil rights and responsibilities. Three examples are: (i) Palestinian property owners are consistently denied permission to modify their homes, build on their lands, and dig water wells on their land. The processes for challenging the legal basis of these decisions are either unclear or not available; (ii) Thousands of Palestinian homes and acres of olives and fruit trees have been destroyed over the last five years, in the name of security. The destruction of the olive trees is especially distressing for Palestinians, as these trees, which have been in families for generations, carry enormous significance in terms of cultural identity and relationship to the land, as well as their economic value; (iii) Since the current Palestinian uprising began in 2000, Israeli forces have killed or seriously injured over 1,600 Palestinian civilians who were not taking part in the hostilities. However the Israeli authorities have investigated fewer than five percent of the fatal incidents to determine whether soldiers were responsible for using force unlawfully. By failing to properly investigate whether or not soldiers have acted unlawfully, the Israeli military has fostered a climate of impunity within its ranks. Civilians have no recourse in such instances.<sup>2</sup>

Restrictions on movement imposed by the Israeli authorities since the outbreak of the second *intifada* severely constrains the right of Palestinians to move freely within the West Bank and Gaza, travel abroad, and access essential services. The movement restrictions are institutionalized by a complex web of permits which are applied to different categories of person. As a result, access to education and medical facilities, to social services, to water and sanitation services, to markets and commercial centres is never guaranteed.

The sections of the wall/barrier under construction by Israel which are inside Palestinian territory divide communities, separating families from their land, water sources, essential services, schools and medical clinics. Farmers now require permits to cross the wall to their own land. In some cases gates in the wall are opened for twelve minutes twice a day. Farmers fear that even this limited access will be reduced and they will be forced to leave their land untended and vulnerable to confiscation by the authorities.

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<sup>2</sup> Promoting Impunity: The Israeli Military's Failure to Investigate Wrong Doing, Human Rights Watch, 2005

Over the last four years, as the capacity of the Palestinian Authority to provide for its constituents has declined, essential services are more likely to be delivered by local and international non government organizations.

### **3. Increasing social and geographic fragmentation.**

The consequences of the impact of the occupation on the Palestinian economy are well documented. Less well documented is the impact of the occupation on the social fabric. One consequence of the restrictions on movement and the web of permits required to move within and between both the West Bank and Gaza, is that people tend to reduce their movements to the bare minimum of what is possible. Without financial resources, and without the necessary permits, families and communities become more insular. A decline in the rule of law in parts of the West Bank and Gaza also contributes to the growing insularity. In the absence of effective governance, families are turning inward, vesting their trust increasingly in their kin. In Gaza particularly, families have begun to take the law into their own hands and observers report an increase in traditional methods of managing conflict such as blood revenge.

Women especially are affected by the social and geographic isolation and are more likely to stay at home and indoors for safety and security reasons. Traditional power relations and social positions within families and communities tend to exclude women and the most vulnerable members of society from participation in decision making processes. The burden of poverty, isolation and chronic violent conflict is driving communities back to socially conservative traditions.

The NGO community is reporting an increase in early marriages, and in domestic violence. The birthrate continues to be amongst the highest in the world, but health care standards are not meeting needs. Very few women and infants access perinatal and post natal care and infant mortality rates are increasing. Malnutrition and micronutrient dietary deficiencies are increasing. Although Palestinians value education highly for both boys and girls, poverty and security concerns mean that there is a growing tendency to give priority to boys' education.

The total population of the occupied Palestinian Territories of the West Bank and Gaza is approximately 3.3 million, of which 40% live in Gaza, one of the mostly densely populated areas on earth. Gaza and the West Bank are geographically separated by Israel and Palestinians are not able to travel freely between the two territories. Although Gaza's southern border is contiguous with Egypt and the West Bank's eastern border is contiguous with Jordan, Israel's tight control of these borders prevents the free movement of people, goods and services. The social and political consequences of this separation are profound. For families and communities it means limited contact with the outside world. For civil society organizations, national agencies and government authorities it means a duplication of services and resources and limited opportunities for face to face dialogue and complementary development.

Israel's unilateral redeployment from inside Gaza, and from four settlements in the northern West Bank in the summer of 2005 is to be understood in the context of the construction of the wall/barrier around and through the West Bank, and an emerging pattern of Israeli efforts to cantonize West bank communities through the creation of a hub and wheel system of roads and barriers. Construction activity, news reports and policy analysis suggest that a web of roads, tunnels and overpasses, for use by Israeli citizens only, will radiate out across the West Bank linking Israeli settlements to Jerusalem, and further dividing and isolating Palestinian communities from each other.

The social and geographic isolation translates into a lack of shared understanding. It increases opportunities for misunderstanding, undermines a collective sense of national identity and it limits the potential for long term strategic action for political, economic and social development.

#### **4. Decreasing standards of governance.**

Established in 1994, under the leadership of President Yasser Aarafat, the Palestinian Authority has not been able to establish the infrastructure, regulatory systems and processes necessary to ensure an open, transparent, accountable and equitable governance structure which is responsive to the needs of the people.

Over the last four years, governance capacity has declined and the population has become increasingly disillusioned with the political processes. However with the change in leadership following the death of President Arafat, hopes were revived that genuine efforts to combat corruption and institute badly needed reforms would take place. The municipal elections in January 2005 were encouraging, but the decision to delay national elections scheduled for the summer of 2005 has not helped build public confidence in the current regime.

As with all other aspects of life here, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict constrains efforts to achieve self determination. The priorities of the Israeli occupation have not been congruent with the strengthening of the Palestinian state apparatus and civil society. Governance structures which evolved to manage the separation of Gaza from the West Bank have led to ambiguities in decision making and lines of authority. There are delays in planning, policy making and implementation of national regulatory structures and coherent delivery of services. As poverty deepens and disillusionment with the international community's commitment to influence the peace process increases, notions of a social contract mediated by a fair and equitable government are discounted by many as unrealistic. Instead, as the rule of law declines, and government ministries fail to deliver, people employ informal, traditional coping mechanisms for exercising power and control over available resources.

In this context social relationships and family connections become extremely important, and in many cases they replace due process in decision making and resource allocation. The exercise of *wasta* achieves results when formal processes fail. *Wasta* describes a

traditional process whereby one obliges an individual in a position of power with whom there is a family or personal connection, to influence a decision to one's benefit.

Furthermore, in the absence of a strong well functioning governance system, women become increasingly marginalized. Despite a high level of participation in higher education women are under represented in all levels of governance, including in village committees, local government and the national legislative council.

## **5. Unclear donor trends.**

Bilateral and multilateral donor assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is high in relation to foreign aid world wide. The World Bank estimates total annual assistance as over \$300 per capita. A small proportion of donor assistance goes into infrastructure development, most is consumed at the household level to maintain livelihoods. According to the analysis of expenditure in the West Bank and Gaza by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics most spending is consumption based. This has ameliorated the impact of economic shock of the last four years and has prevented a decline into absolute poverty for many. However it raises questions about sustainability. Will donors continue to provide this level of support should the peace process remain unresolved and in the absence of significant structural reform within the Palestinian Authority?

The European Union are the largest providers of donor support, followed by the Arab States and the US Government. A large proportion of the aid package is bilateral, and it is estimated that international development agencies, with funding support from governments and their own privately raised funds provide less than 15% of the total aid directed at the occupied Palestinian Territories. The current aid package available to international non government agencies is primarily for humanitarian assistance. However, donors have indicated that they would redirect aid to the reconstruction and development of Palestinian institutions, civil society and governance structures following positive moves toward a peace process and significant governance reform.

Concerns with misappropriation of funds, and the channeling of funds to benefit those who promote violent conflict has led to increasing donor scrutiny and conditionality. The most contentious of which is the USG's anti-terrorism certification which requires all recipients of USG funds to certify that the funds will not be used to provide support of any kind to a person or entity known to advocate terrorism or engage in terrorist activity. Profound differences in understanding of the concept of terrorism and how it is applied led the Palestinian Legislative Council to pass a law in 2004 forbidding Palestinian non government organizations to accept such conditionality. This matter remains unresolved.

## **Conclusion:**

The outcomes of our process and analysis are the mission and strategic directions written here. We believe they represent a significant and inspiring challenge for CARE in the


West Bank and Gaza, and for CARE International as a whole. We are committed to developing our organization over the coming years to be able to meet this challenge.

## The Strategy for CARE in West Bank & Gaza

CARE International's mission in the West Bank and Gaza is to engage with Palestinian communities in development processes that enable them to determine their future, realize their rights and live in peace and dignity.

### Our Strategic Directions

To achieve our mission we have developed five inter-related strategic directions to guide our work and increase our effectiveness.



## **Strategic directions: rationale, explanation and indicators of progress**

As we progress, we shall continue to review our impact and use regular opportunities to reflect on our experience and plan our work at a local and national level. We see the directions as determining our strategy for the coming period of five years, and we have developed broad indicators of progress to support us in continuing our strategic dialogue and evaluating our impact.

### **Strategic Direction One: Meet the humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable Palestinians in times of emergency.**

The lack of stability in the region, and the lack of clarity vis a vis the peace process means that CARE's capacity to respond to emergency humanitarian and rehabilitation needs will be maintained in the Country office. Our sectoral areas are health, food security and water. We have substantial capacity to respond rapidly to both the acute phase and the rehabilitation phase of a humanitarian crisis. Our expertise lies in large scale procurement, installation of locally appropriate water and sanitation systems, emergency medical assistance in pharmaceuticals and medical disposables, emergency room trauma training, community health worker training and emergency preparedness.

In the **immediate term**, the proposed Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip may well precipitate another humanitarian crisis. CARE is working with the UN agencies and fellow NGO's to assess, scenario plan and develop emergency preparedness capacity in the local municipalities and other agencies.

In the **intermediate term**, we propose to expand the scope of our rehabilitation program in food security and water assistance to include Gaza as well as in rural communities in the northern West Bank. This program has funding support from ECHO and the EC.

In the **longer term**, we propose to build emergency preparedness capacity at the local level, and possibly with line ministries such as the Ministries of Planning and Health.

#### **Strategic indicators of our effectiveness:**

- How many emergencies have taken place? In what ways have we responded?
- What is the nature and extent of the preparedness we have built in other organizations?
- How effectively have these other organizations responded?

**Strategic Direction Two: Develop the livelihood capacities and social positions of the most vulnerable communities by working in an integrated and sustained way.**

Restrictions on movement, loss of opportunity to sell labour, goods and services in Israel, decline in the rule of law and poor quality and delivery of basic services has led to impoverishment, especially in those communities adjacent to Israel. Overall, we observe a deepening social and geographic fragmentation of Palestinian society.

Palestinians have coped by increasing their reliance on their extended family to provide for their basic socio-economic needs. Social workers report a trend towards conservatism which impacts negatively on the social positions of the most vulnerable; women, children and the very poor. Although education for both girls and boys is highly valued, early marriage of daughters is an increasingly utilized last resort for very poor families. Safety and security concerns keeps many women and girls imprisoned in their homes. Few communities have public places where women can meet together. Women are now less likely to participate in public decision-making bodies such as municipal councils. Domestic violence, incest and other abuses are taboo topics in Palestinian society. However health professionals report that these indicators of family dysfunction are increasingly a backdrop to illnesses presented.

Against this backdrop CARE will work with vulnerable communities in the northern West Bank & Gaza to identify and realize their long-term development aspirations. The communities with whom we develop partnerships will be identified according to criteria including livelihood vulnerability, readiness to address issues such as social exclusion and power relations, and their interest in engaging in a long-term holistic process.

We will assist these communities to develop their long term strategy for strengthening local infrastructure, enhancing access to services, improving livelihoods, increasing participation in decision making, addressing inequities in social and gender power relations which inhibit human potential

Our approach is to facilitate a long-term integrated development program that is owned and managed by the community. Specific interventions will be designed in cooperation with community representatives to ensure integration into the community's overall development plan. Our role includes assisting these communities to identify and access resources by building local capacities and by acting as a broker and interlocutor with donors and other development agencies

**Strategic indicators of our effectiveness:**

- To what extent has the operating context allowed for an integrated development approach?
- What steps have we taken toward developing community plans?
- With which communities have we been involved in supporting the development of community plans?
- What are the impacts on livelihoods and social positions in those communities?

**Strategic Direction Three: Strengthen the processes and structures of governance in Palestinian organizations.**

Governance structures in the West Bank and Gaza have never been unified and developed into one coherent whole. Just 11 years old, and actively inhibited by an uncooperative occupier, the Palestinian Authority almost collapsed as a result of its weak capacity. The two different land tenure systems, legal statutes, regulations and traditions inherited from Jordanian rule in the West Bank and Egyptian control in Gaza have never been reconciled into one unified system. Government reform is promised, and has considerable donor support.

We understand that a vibrant civil society is an essential component of good governance. We will build our civil society experience and expertise, initially in Gaza, to strengthen governance, policies and the representative capacities of civil society organizations, syndicates, local government and municipalities. Our approach will be to build local capacity to increase accountability, representation, governance structures, and effective planning and management. We will seek to expand our civil society and governance work both in Gaza and the northern West Bank. Our focus is on the governance structures in the specific communities with whom we are engaging in a long-term development process.

On the basis of this experience CARE will also seek to contribute actively to national development planning with the Ministries of Planning, Health and Environment.

**Strategic indicators of our effectiveness:**

- To what extent was it possible to engage with civil society organizations, municipal authorities and government ministries?
- With how many CSO's are we currently engaged?
- What has been the scope of our capacity building for stronger governance?
- In what ways has the management of resources, the delivery of services and the representative actions of these organizations become more effective as a result?

**Strategic Direction Four: Advocate for the development, humanitarian and governance priorities of vulnerable Palestinian communities on the basis of sound policy analysis and field experience.**

We believe that in order to address the underlying causes of poverty in the West Bank and Gaza we should be doing more than meeting needs. This position is based on the premise that thoughtful humanitarian and development assistance enables Palestinian communities to survive and adapt to prevailing circumstances. However, such assistance fails to tackle the deep, underlying causes of poverty and injustice. This is nowhere more evident than in the context of the West Bank and Gaza. Here the underlying causes of poverty and injustice are multidimensional. They arise not only from Israel's occupation

of the West Bank and Gaza, and from weak governance structures inside Palestine, but from unresolved concepts of Palestinian and Israeli national identity and legitimacy, and the geopolitical interests of the powerful nations.

CARE's adoption of a rights based approach to programming leads us inevitably toward engagement in policy analysis and advocacy as critical tools to assist disenfranchised communities to claim their right to live in peace and dignity.

This does not mean that CARE seeks to be a human rights organization which monitors abuses, and advocates stridently for rights. Rather, CARE will play a role in promoting the development and application of policies at all levels that further peace and dignity. Our approach is one of principled, constructive engagement with our development partners. Our advocacy will be grounded in our field experience and will be based on sound policy analysis.

We will work with local and international partners to influence the development of policies, which allow the communities with whom we work to participate in the realization of their rights and responsibilities. This work will build on CARE's capacity to act as a trusted expert informant.

**Strategic indicators of our effectiveness:**

- Has our advocacy strategy been developed and is it being implemented?
- What is the extent of our engagement with coalitions addressing policy issues?
- In what ways are we contributing to a body of research that informs policy at all levels?
- Which are the advocacy issues we are addressing?
- What has happened to policy on the issues with which we have been involved?

**Strategic Direction Five: Extend our sphere of understanding and influence through stronger linkages with a wide range of development partners.**

As part of our strategic planning process we embarked upon an external context analysis. We reviewed the literature and consulted with key agencies and individuals. During our consultations it became clear that we see a vibrant civil society, strong local NGO's and many respected local research and development agencies. Local universities provide post secondary education to young women and men, and there are many opportunities for graduates to obtain scholarships to the best international academic institutions.

Yet human development potential is not realized. The collective sum is not greater than the individual parts. Partly this is the result of the inability of the Palestinian Authority to build a governance framework to guide development. Partly it is a consequence of the socially eroding effects of the occupation and in particular the extent to which Israeli

intelligence has penetrated Palestinian society, resulting in increased distrust amongst individuals, and restricting the possibility of strong social movements.

However some responsibility for the lack of connectedness at the development level must lie also with development agencies and institutions themselves. International development and donor agencies must recognize that their work may undermine local capacity and inhibit the full expression of Palestinian social capital. The challenge is for international development agencies to identify the spaces in which they may work effectively for the benefit of the greater good. CARE has defined that space in terms of our responsibility to deepen our understanding of the underlying causes of poverty and extend our sphere of influence in order to be more effective in our work.

We will draw on our long experience working in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza to establish linkages with groups that are committed to furthering the development processes that will enable the realization of rights and the opportunities to live in peace and dignity. We will strengthen our partnerships with local agencies to ensure that local capacity is fully realized, that efforts are not duplicated and that our respective spheres of influence are expanded. Stronger linkages with development partners at the local, regional and international levels will be achieved through focused, active participation in local and national sectoral coordination groups, and other forums with development partners including government agencies, donors, universities, research centres, local NGO's and community based organizations.

**Strategic indicators of our effectiveness:**

- In how many forums was CARE active?
- In which ways have the approaches and strategies of other organizations changed as a result of CARE's involvement?
- How effectively have our approaches changed a result of our engagement with others?
- What number of papers, policy documents or presentations have been disseminated or presented and to whom?
- What do we judge the impact to have been of those papers and documents?

## Next steps: bringing the strategy to life

### Developing the organization to realize the strategy

To realize the Mission and Strategy that we have adopted for CARE West Bank and Gaza, we recognize that we need to strengthen the following aspects of our organizational capacity and form to:

- Improve our program quality at all stages of design, implementation and evaluation
- Build flexibility into the organization to be more proactive and responsive to changing realities on the ground, and to capitalize more fully on our experience and learning
- Develop more effective decision making processes that can build understanding and involvement appropriately in key policy decisions, and can enact regular management decisions more efficiently and effectively
- Strengthen significantly the fundamental understanding and ability to work within development processes and interventions in complex social and political settings
- Build an organizational culture that prizes learning and the dynamism and energy that results from active learning
- Build an organizational culture that prizes co-operation and service, and seeks to place the interests of the communities we work with, and the colleagues that we support at the forefront of decisions and actions
- Reduce the overhead costs of our country office operation to be more cost efficient and attractive to potential funders and partner organizations

To do all of the above, we require a comprehensive approach to our organizational development that addresses each of the following:

- Organizational form – the structure of our organization, the roles of key teams, and the roles of individuals within those teams to create flexibility, complementarity, efficiency and increased quality in all aspects of our work
- Understanding and capacities for leadership and management – within key leadership teams, and within key positions in the country office to build the effectiveness of everything we do
- Organizational mind-sets and behaviours – to confront potentially constraining cultural norms within our organization, and to develop a commitment to renewing and challenging ourselves to do things better all the time

### Key areas of focus for the organizational development process

We have therefore agreed that there are four key ‘pillars’ of activity contributing to the organization’s development. These four pillars have been identified so that it is possible to engage with each semi-independently for the purposes of keeping the overall OD

process clear and manageable, and to provide accessible ‘starting points’ for what will be a long-term and complex process. However, we also recognize explicitly that the four areas are highly interdependent, and progress in any one, will have important impacts on the others. The pillars in which we will focus activity are:

- Organizational structure/form
- Program quality and impact
- Leadership and management
- Values and behaviour

**A route map for the organizational development process:**



The process is designed to find a balance between taking a comprehensive and interwoven approach to the organizational development needs of CARE West Bank & Gaza, while providing clear ‘entry points’ to set the ball rolling.

Providing added momentum to developments in program quality will maintain the critical focus on CARE’s strategic intent in West Bank & Gaza. Simultaneously undertaking a review of organizational structure and making required changes will provide a stronger platform for addressing other aspects of organizational development that are needed.

The process is explicitly based on a long-term and holistic appreciation of the challenges inherent in any such undertaking, as well as the particular challenges facing CARE in WB/G. It will require sustained commitment to the organization's strategy and the broad vision for the organization, as well as the flexibility to adjust to circumstances as the process unfolds and changes take place internally and externally.

**Phase 1:** Following the articulation of a vision for the organization, and major constraints in each pillar, work will begin on Phase 1 of the process. This will involve:

- a) **Targeted strengthening of priority programmatic understanding and competencies that are required to bring the strategy to life:** This work, supported by the Program Advisor of the RMU, will complement existing developments already underway in the office around Gender understanding and programming. It is envisaged that it will broaden to encompass a wider perspective on rights based approaches, including building the awareness and confidence to work with participation, empowerment and with a greater understanding of power relations in development approaches.

**Timing:** The work will begin during first quarter of FY/06 and will be seen as an ongoing stream of activity, building the learning, understanding and application continuously.

- b) **Organizational structure and form:** taking as its starting point the CO strategy and broad vision for the future organization (see above), a focused review of the overall CO structure, (including appropriate decision making bodies & consultation mechanisms) will be commissioned, and recommendations provided for revisions to that structure. Options for different organizational models will be explored.

**Timing:** The proposed review and recommendations are scheduled to take place within the first quarter of FY/06. Revisions to structure would ideally take place and be complete by end of second quarter at the latest.

**Phase 2:**

- a) **Strengthening the quality of leadership and management:** following revisions to the organizational structure, and linking in to initiatives underway to strengthen program quality, attention will focus on building the quality of leadership and management in the organization. Particular focus will be given to the leading decision making and consultation bodies established who will be taking the major responsibility for the strategic development of CARE's work in West Bank & Gaza. This stream of activity may include work with both teams and individuals to develop understanding and support more effective leadership and management in practice.

**Timing:** Work on leadership and management will begin as soon as possible in the light of structural changes in the organization. Ideally this will be planned and underway by the start of third quarter at the latest.

**Throughout the process:**

- a) **Developing appropriate values and behaviour:** this stream of activity inevitably runs throughout the process. Developments here are both an intended outcome of focused activity in the other pillars, but also may require more explicit focus as the OD process progresses. There are significant 'value & behavioural' issues to tackle in the Country Office, and attention to negative factors, as well as building consensus around more effective behaviours is something that cannot be clearly prescribed in the process upfront.

**Timing:** This area will therefore be 'woven in' to all other aspects of the OD process, and particular interventions may be undertaken throughout as appropriate.

## 6. Annex 1 Contributors to the process

### 6.1 Strategic Directions Steering Group 2004-5 Members

John Viste	Assistant Country Director
Salam Kanaan	Health Sector Coordinator
Hisham Sawaftah	Program Manager
Firyal Snounu	Capacity Building Specialist
Ayman Mashni	DME Manager
Liz Sime	Country Director
Lesley Ellarby	Organizational Development Consultant

### 6.2 Key Informants

Dr Nader Said	Director of Department for Development Studies, BirZeit University, Ramallah
Sima Kanaan	Deputy Director World Bank Jerusalem
Sharry Lapp	Ford Foundation, Cairo
Maha Abu-Dayyah Shamma	Director, Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling
Ton Berg	Country Representative, Oxfam GB Jerusalem
Eric Fort	Country Representative, Action Against Hunger, Jerusalem

### 6.3 Strategy Development Workshop 1. Ramallah, September 6-7, 2004

1. Lesley Ellarby	Facilitator
2. Hisham Sawaftah	Project Manager
3. Othman Abbas	Field Manager
4. Ghassan Shakhshir	Field Operations Manager
5. John Viste	Assistant Country Director
6. Salam Kanaan	Health Sector Coordinator
7. Oscar Pinheiro	Capacity Building Manager
8. Ranya Karam	Finance Manager
9. Ayman Shuaibi	HLS, MOST Coordinator
10. Jackline Tabet	Procurement & Contracts Officer
11. Shuaa Marrar	Capacity Building Specialist
12. Iman Al Taher	Field Representative SAFES
13. Afnan Douglas	HR Specialist
14. Fadiyah Oweis	Health Co-ordinator Assistant
15. Ayman Mashni	DME Manager
16. Saeed Jaber	IT Specialist
17. Firas Budeiri	Asst. Logistician
18. Majeda Nabhan	HR/Admin Manager
19. Firyal Snounu	Capacity Building Specialist
20. Elizabeth Sime	Country Director
21. Nisreen Najjar	Capacity Building Specialist
22. Jawad Abu-Harb	Capacity Building Specialist
23. Suhad Kaspari	Field Representative Jenin
24. Nadera Shibly	Logistics

- |                       |               |
|-----------------------|---------------|
| 25. Shada Jabari      | Documentation |
| 26. Nader Abu Al Hawa | Fleet         |

#### **6.4 Strategy Development Workshop 2. Jericho Nov 29- Dec 2, 2004**

- |                        |                                 |
|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Lesley Ellarby      | Facilitator                     |
| 2. Hisham Sawaftah     | Project Manager                 |
| 3. Othman Abbas        | Field Manager                   |
| 4. Ghassan Shakhshir   | Field Operations Manager        |
| 5. John Viste          | Assistant Country Director      |
| 6. Salam Kanaan        | Health Sector Coordinator       |
| 7. Ranya Karam         | Finance Manager                 |
| 8. Ayman Shuaibi       | HLS, MOST Coordinator           |
| 9. Jackline Tabet      | Procurement & Contracts Officer |
| 10. Shuaa Marrar       | Capacity Building Specialist    |
| 11. Iman Al Taher      | Field Representative SAFES      |
| 12. Afnan Douglas      | HR Specialist                   |
| 13. Fadiyah Oweis      | Health Co-ordinator Assistant   |
| 14. Ayman Mashni       | DME Manager                     |
| 15. Saeed Jaber        | IT Specialist                   |
| 16. Firas Budeiri      | Asst. Logistician               |
| 17. Majeda Nabhan      | HR/Admin Manager                |
| 18. Firyal Snounu      | Capacity Building Specialist    |
| 19. Elizabeth Sime     | Country Director                |
| 20. Sameera Rifai      | Country Coordinator             |
| 21. Peter Laban        | Regional Coordinator            |
| 22. Wael Kirresh       | Security Officer                |
| 23. Basem Aref         | Finance Officer                 |
| 24. Yusef Abu-Aljedian | Tamkeen Gaza Director           |
| 25. Nisreen Najjar     | Capacity Building Specialist    |
| 26. Jawad Abu Harb     | Capacity Building Specialist    |
| 27. Nika Salvetta      | Netherlands                     |
| 28. Gregoire de Sachy  | France                          |
| 29. Marwa El-Ansary    | UK                              |
| 30. Raja Jarrah        | UK                              |
| 31. Felix Wolff        | Germany                         |
| 32. Sara Simon         | CI Secretariat Brussels         |
| 33. Kevin Fitzcharles  | CARE USA                        |
| 34. Nadera Shibly      | Logistics                       |
| 35. Shada Jabari       | Documentation                   |
| 36. Nader Abu Al Hawa  | Fleet                           |

#### **6.5 Strategy Development Workshop 3. Jericho 22-24 February, 2005**

- |                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| 1. Lesley Ellarby  | Facilitator                              |
| 2. Hisham Sawaftah | Program Manager: Food Security/Water     |
| 3. Othman Abbas    | Field Rep/Team Lder: Food Security/Water |
| 4. Ghassan Shakhir | Field Operations Manager: EMAP           |

5. John Viste	Assistant Country Director
6. Salam Kanaan	Sector Coordinator: Health
7. Ranya Karam	Finance Manager
8. Ayman Shuaibi	Project Manager: MOST, HIS EMAP
9. Jackline Tabetlo	Procurement & Contracts Officer
10. Shuaa Marrar	Project Manager: CB/Ashtar
11. Iman Al Taher	Field Representative: Food Security/Water
12. Afnan Douglas	HR Specialist
13. Fadia Oweis	Assist. Health Ed. Coordinator: EMAP
14. Ayman Mashni	DME Manager
15. Saeed Jaber	IT Specialist
16. Firas Budeiri	Logistician: EMAP
17. Majeda Nabhan	HR/Admin Manager
18. Firyal Snounu	Capacity Building Specialist: EMAP
19. Nizreen Najjar	Civil Society Specialist: Tamkeen
20. Jawad Harb	Civil Society Specialist: Tamkeen
21. Elizabeth Sime	Country Director
22. Sameera Rifai	Country Coordinator: Empowers
23. Peter Laban	Regional Coordinator: Empowers
24. Yusef Abujedian	Gaza Director: Tamkeen
25. Wael Kirresh	Safety & Security
26. Basem Al-Aref	Finance Officer
27. Jon Mitchell	Regional Director
28. Jane Iredale	Livelihoods Consultant
29. SaleemAl-Yahya	Construction Engineer Food Security/Water
30. Niveen Manarios	Assistant Accountant
31. Ramzi Khamis	Accountant
32. Nadera Shibly	Logistics & Documentation
33. Nader Abu Al Hawa	Fleet

## **7. Annex 2 Summary of key documents**

### **7.1 Working Documents Created During the Strategic Directions Process**

1. Donor Map: May 2004
2. Internal Context Analysis, June 2004
3. CI Members Strategic Priorities, June 2004
4. External Context Analysis: August 2004
5. CARE Program and Implementation Guidelines, August 2004
6. Interim Analysis Paper: September 2004
7. Increased understanding of Needs; September 2004
8. Coordination with Government, Donors and NGO's: October 2004
9. Building on the Interim Analysis, October, 2004
10. Program & Funding History: CARE WBG 1994-2004, October 2004
11. Mapping the strategies and programs of major INGOS and Major Palestinian NGOs, November 2004
12. Operating Environment Scenarios: November, 2004

### **7.2 Key Reference Documents**

1. The Components Leading to Good Programming, MERMU 2001
2. World Bank Report on the Impact of the Intifada, May 2003
3. Moving CARE's Programming Forward: Summary Paper, Unifying Framework for Poverty Eradication, Social Justice and Underlying Causes of Poverty, McCaston, 2004
4. West Bank Livelihood Assessment, Iredale, 2004
5. CARE WBG Emergency Program Strategic Review, Telford, 2004
6. World Bank West Bank & Gaza Update, March 2004